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CASE NOTES
DEEDS-Cancellation by the Parties.-Grantor executed
and delivered a deed to the husband alone which was recorded. Because his wife had furnished part of the consideration, the husband requested grantor to make a second
deed to them jointly, which grantor executed and delivered.
It was recorded with the notation that it was a correction
deed, substituted for the former one. Plaintiffs, devisees
of the wife, relying on the second deed, sued for partition
and an accounting by defendant, who claimed under the
first deed as sole heir at law of the husband. The Circuit
Court found that plaintiffs held an undivided half interest in
fee simple, reversing the master's finding for defendant, and
thus giving effect to the mutual intention of the parties
to cancel and rescind the prior deed because of mistake. On
app-al, HELD: Affirmed. Cox v. Tanner, 229 S. C. 568, 93
S. E. 2d 905 (1956).
Delivery of the deed vests title in the grantee. Watson v.
Cox, 117 S. C. 24, 108 S. E. 168 (1921) ; MeCants v. McConnell, 1 Mill Const. 190 (S. C. 1817). Most courts hold that
the grantee will not be divested of his title by a cancellation
of the deed which the parties attempt by re-delivery to the
grantor or by destroying it, even though they intend so to
divest his title and revest it in the grantor. Sally v. Sandifer,
2 Mill Const. 445, 12 Am. Dec. 687 (S. C. 1818) ; Turnipseed
v. Busby, 1 McCord 279 (S. C. 1821) ; accord, Booker v. Stivender, 13 Rich. 85 (S. C. 1860). However, some jurisdictions have held that such cancellation revests the equitable
title in the grantor if the deed was not recorded; Happ v.
Happ, 156 Ill. 183, 41 N. E. 39 (1895) ; Russell v. Meyer, 7
N. D. 335, 75 N. W. 262, 47 L. R. A. 637 (1898) ; or even if
it was recorded. Mauldin v. Howell, 212 Ark. 268, 205 S. W.
2d 446 (1947). Other courts have reached the result that
such cancellation of an unrecorded deed revests title in the
grantor as a practical matter for one of the following reasons: (1) Because the grantee is estopped from introducing
parol or secondary evidence of his deed, since he has voluntarily surrendered or destroyed the evidence of his title;
Thompson v. Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 68 Am. Dec. 638 (1857) ;
Mussey v. Holt, 24 N. H. 248, 55 Am. Dec. 234 (1851); (2)
483
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Because the cancellation together with other circumstances
estops him from asserting title or from denying that the
grantor has title; Bates v. Hall, 305 Ky. 467, 204 S. W. 2d 487
(1947) ; Ermerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Cook, 165
Minn. 198, 206 N. W. 170, 43 A. L. R. 41 (1925) ; (3) Or because the jurisdiction holds that title does not pass until the
deed is recorded and it is cancelled before registration. Austin
v. King, 91 N. C. 286 (1884) ; accord, Respass v. Jones, 102
N. C. 5, 8 S. E. 770 (1889).
At law, the grantor completely divests himself of title by
executing and delivering a deed to the grantee; hence, he
cannot possibly convey any interest by a subsequent deed.
King v. MoDuffie, 144 Ga. 318, 87 S. E. 22 (1915). But
despite the legal theory, most courts hold that unless the
rights of third persons intervene under the first deed, the
grantee's acceptance of a subsequent inconsistent conveyance from the grantor will have the effect of cancelling the
first deed. Reeves v. Walker, 219 Ky. 615, 294 S. W. 183
(1927); People v. Tompkins-Kiel Marble Co., 269 N. Y. 77,
199 N. E. 10 (1935). The court may hold the second deed the
operative conveyance and the first one cancelled by mutual
consent of the parties on a theory of novation; Hall v. Wright,
137 Ky. 39, 138 Ky. 71, 127 S. W. 516 (1910); Redding v.
Vogt, 140 N. C. 562, 53 S. E. 337 (1906) ; or on the theory that
whenever a court of equity would have power to cancel or
reform a deed, the parties can do it themselves by agreement
without the aid of a court. Reid v. Reid, 230 Ky. 835, 20 S.W.
2d 1015 (1929) ; Cales v. Ford, 126 W. Va. 158, 28 S. E. 2d
429, 150 A. L. R. 398 (1943). Thus, on a theory of reformation, the second deed has been held operative and the first
one cancelled by mutual agreement of the parties for failure
of consideration; Cales v. Ford, supra; or for mistake, Reid
v. Reid, supra.
This seems to be a case where law and equity conflict.
The legal theory is that execution and delivery of a deed
completely divest the grantor's title, and consequently, he
has none to convey by a second deed. But the modern trend
of the cases is to give effect to the intention of the parties
despite the legal theory and hold a cancellation attempted
by the parties themselves effective on equitable principles,
especially when the grantee has accepted a second inconsistent deed. Such a holding illustrates the historical function
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of Courts of Equity to break through the legal forms in order
to give substantial justice according to the equities of the
case. In the instant case the Court undoubtedly reached the
correct result in accordance with the equities of the situation
and the modern trend of the cases.
HENRY SUMmERALL, JR.

JURIES - VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION - Propriety of
Questions Concerning Racial Prejudice. Defendant, a
Negro, was prosecuted for rape of a white woman. On the
voir dire examination, counsel for defendant sought to inquire of each prospective juror whether he had any prejudice
against a Negro which would make him require less evidence
to convict a Negro of the crime of rape than to convict a
white man. Also, counsel sought to inquire whether the juror
would be less inclined to believe a Negro witness than a white
witness. All questions pertaining to racial prejudice were
excluded by the court. The jury returned a verdict of guilty
and defendant appealed. HELD: Error. New trial granted.
The rulings were an abuse of the court's discretion denying
defendant his rights under a statute providing that "either
party may examine each juror as to his qualifications to sit."
State v. Higgs, 143 Conn. 138, 120 A. 2d 152 (1956).
It is fundamental that fairness and an unprejudiced mind
are necessary qualifications of a juror called upon to try one
accused of crime. People v. Reyes, 5 Cal. 347 (1855) ; Withers
v. State, 30 Tex. App. 383, 17 S. W. 936 (1891). The voir dire
examination is directed toward determining the state of mind
of the prospective juror and is said to have a dual purpose:
1) to reveal grounds for challenge for cause, and 2) to furnish
information enabling the party to determine the advisability
of exercising the right of peremptory challenge. Kizer v.
State, 67 Okla. Crim. 16, 93 P. 2d 58 (1939) ; State v. Tharp,
42 Wash. 2d 494, 256 P. 2d 482 (1953). The scope of the examination is largely within the discretion of the trial court.
State v. King, 158 S. C. 251, 155 S. E. 409 (1930) ; State v.
Stonestreet, 112 W. Va. 668, 166 S. E. 378 (1932). Such discretion will not be disturbed unless it is clearly abused and
the party complaining has been prejudiced thereby. State v.
Lytle, 177 Kan. 408, 280 P. 2d 924 (1955) ; Strong v. State,
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106 Neb. 339, 183 N. W. 559 (1921). When it is found that a
juror has a racial prejudice against a Negro defendant or his
lawyer which may influence his verdict, the juror is properly
excused for cause. People v. Decker, 157 N. Y. 186, 51 N. E.
1018 (1898); State v. Sanders, 103 S. C. 216, 88 S. E. 10
(1915) ; State v. Dean, 134 W. Va. 257, 58 S. E. 2d 860 (1950).
The mere existence of some racial prejudice against the race
as a whole of a social nature or which takes the form of a
feeling that the Negro race is inferior, may not be sufficient
in itself to technically disqualify a juror. Johnson v. State,
88 Neb. 565, 130 N. W. 282 (1911); Bass v. State, 59 Tex.
Crim. 186, 127 S. W. 1020 (1910). However, questioning
concerning racial prejudice has been recognized for its usefulness in divulging pertinent information for the intelligent
use of peremptory challenges. Hill v. State, 112 Miss. 260, 72
So. 1003 (1916) ; Fendrick v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. 147, 45 S.
W. 589 (1898). When questions provided by statute to be
used for the interrogation of jurors to determine their competency have been satisfactorily answered, it is generally
held that any further examination is within the discretion of
the court. Commonwealth v. Cero, 264 Mass. 264, 162 N. E.
349 (1928); State v. Bethune, 93 S. C. 195, 75 S. E. 281
(1912). Thus, if a juror has once denied consciousness of any
bias or prejudice against a defendant in answer to a general
statutory question, it has been held that a specific question
concerning racial prejudice may properly be excluded. Com-monwealth v. Lee, 324 Mass. 714, 88 N. E. 2d 713 (1949) ;
State v. Bethune, supra. Some courts have refused to permit
questioning of jurors with regard to racial prejudice which
-might influence their acceptance of the testimony of Negro
-witnesses. Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 196, 12 So. 677 (1893) ;
State v. Dyer, 154 La. 379, 97 So. 563 (1923). However, this
type of question has often been used on voir dire examinations, see e. g., Burrage v. State, 101 Miss. 598, 58 So. 217
(1912); Moore v. State, 52 Tex. Crim. 336, 107 S. W. 540
(1908), and the great weight of authority has held that the
court's refusal to permit questions directed toward disclosing
whether the prospective juror is so prejudiced against the
Negro race that it would take less evidence for him to convict
a Negro than a white person, constitutes reversible error.
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U. S. 308, 73 A. L. R. 1203
(1931) ; Pinder v. State, 27 Fla. 370, 8 So. 837 (1891) ; Hill v.
State, 112 Miss. 260, 72 So. 1003 (1916).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss3/9

4

19571

et al.: CASE NOTES

CASE NOTES

The decision in the principal case is eminently sound.
Though the courts have been cautious to prevent questioning
on voir dire examinations calculated to embarrass or harass
the juror, it would seem to be the prevailing view that the
scope of the examination should not be so restricted as to
prevent disclosure of the personal prejudices of the individual
jurors which might sway their judgment. Despite the fact
that the courts have laid considerable emphasis on the degree
of racial prejudice entertained by the juror in deciding upon
his competency, those jurisdictions that have been faced with
the problem, including South Carolina, agree on the proposition that a juror who appears to have such racial prejudice
as will preclude his rendering a fair verdict, should not be
considered qualified. Since the effects of racial prejudice are
recognized by the courts, it would seem only reasonable that
they should allow the most beneficial use to be made of the
only practical method of uncovering it. Distinctions that
have been made between questions concerning the credibility
of Negro witnesses and those designed to elicit racial prejudice against a Negro defendant which will distort the juror's
view of the law and evidence, can hardly be justified when
considered in light of the ultimate goal of assuring the defendant a fair trial. The absence of any such distinction in the
principal case is in keeping with the recognition by the court
of the necessity in a criminal prosecution of procuring a body
of jurors who are able to judge the guilt or innocence of the
accused objectively.
CHARLES E. BAKER.

REVOCATION OF LICENSE-Disparaging Remarks of
One Physician About Another as Basis for Disciplinary Proceedings.-Petitioner, a physician, sought prohibition to restrain proceedings before The Board of Medical Examiners to
revoke his license. The statute conferred upon it authority to
suspend temporarily or permanently the license of a physician guilty of "unprofessional conduct," which was defined
by the statute as "conduct unbecoming a person licensed to
practice medicine or which is detrimental to the best interest
of the public." The physician had in private conversation
criticized harshly three other physicians in the county and
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the entire medical profession. HELD: Prohibition granted. A
physician's slanderous language alone did not warrant revocation of his license. Boswell v. Board of Medical Examiners,
-

Nev.

-,

293 P. 2d 424 (1956).

It wds recognized in England 300 years ago and has been
the law in this country ever since that one of the rights reserved to the states is to determine the qualifications for
office and the conditions upon which citizens may exercise
various callings and pursuits within limits. The Bonham
case, 8 Coke 1142 (1861). There is no distinction between
refusing to grant a license and revoking a license already
granted. Both are an exercise of police power, the object of
which is to exclude incompetent persons from the practice
of medicine. State Medical Bd. v. McCrary, 95 Ark. 511, 130
S. W. 544, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 783 (1910) ; Kennedy v. State
Bd. of Registry, etc., 145 Mich. 241, 108 N. W. 730 (1906) ;
State ex rel Chapman v. So. Medical Examiners, 34 Minn. 387,
26 N. W. 123 (1885). Since a license is not a contract, and
gives the holder no right to practice in the future unrestricted,
it follows that any license may be revoked and such revocation
alone is not a taking without due process. State v. Webster,
150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 212 (1898) ;
Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, etc., 66 Kan. 710,
72 Pac. 247 (1903), affirmed in 195 U. S. 625 (1904). However, the right to practice is a valuable property right entitled to protection of due process of law; thus the practitioner is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in
defense of his right to practice. State v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238 (1884) ; Gage v. Censors of N. H. Electric Medical Soc., 63 N. H. 92, 50 Am. Rep.
492 (1884). The legislature has power to invest an officer,
board, or department with power and duty to hear, investigate, and determine a charge against a person holding a
license or certificate to practice medicine, drugless healing,
dentistry, or optometry in the state; Shivson v. Schafer, 354
Pa. 458, 47 A. 2d 665 (1946) ; Buhl v. Univ. of State of N. Y.,
50 N. Y. S. 2d 392, 182 Misc. 786 (1944); Francisco v. Bd.
of Dental Examiners, Civ. App., 149 S. W. 2d 619 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941), and to revoke his license or certificate. Fich v.
Siverston, 208 Minn. 102, 292 N.W. 758 (1940) ; State ex 're
Munch v. Davis, 143 Fla. 236, 196 So. 491 (1940). The boards
have broad discretionary powers and if no appeal is pro-
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vided for and the exercise of these powers is not unreasonable and is free from fraud and oppression, the courts will
not disturb it; the findings of fact will be conclusive on the
courts to which the actions are brought for review. Iowa
Electrical Medical College Assn. v. Shroudes, 87 Iowa 659, 55
N. W. 24 (1893) ; Allan v. Burrows, 69 Kan. 812, 77 Pac. 555
(1904); Munk v. Frink, 81 Mo. 631, 116 N. W_ 525 (1908).
The legislature may declare acts or conduct for which a license may be revoked, but the acts or conduct should be designated with certainty and definiteness, Green v. Blanchard,
138 Ark. 137, 211 S. W. 375, 5 A. L. R. 84 (1919) ; Hewitt V.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39
(1906), and be such as affect the safety and morals of the
public. Hewitt v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra; Ex
parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257 (1888). Statutes providing for revocation of a physician's or dentist's license in some jurisdictions are considered remedial for the protection of the public; Ramsey v. Shelton, 327 Ill. 432, 160 N. E.
769 (1928); Richardson v. Simpson, 88 Kan. 684, 129 Pac.
1128 (1913); but in other jurisdictions such statutes are
regarded as highly penal and fall within the rule requiring
strict construction of penal statutes. Abrams v. Jones, 35
Idaho 532, 207 Pac. 724 (1922) ; State v. Clark, 288 Mo. 649,
232 S. W. 1031 (1921) ; McPheeters v. Bd. of Medical Examiners of Calif., 103 Cal. App. 297, 284 Pac. 938 (1930). The
performing of or aiding or abetting in the performance of a
criminal abortion, Mo. ex rel Hurwitz v. North, 271 U. S.
40 (1926) ; Munk v. Frink, 81 Neb. 631, 116 N. W. 525, 17
L. R. A. (N. S.) 587 (1908), and the practice of medicine
or any of its branches under a false or assumed name, Grisso
v. Medical Examiners, 75 Cal. App. 385, 242 Pac. 912 (1925) ;
People v. Appelbauns, 251 Ill. 18, 95 N. E. 995 (1911), are
grounds for revocation usually expressly provided in the
statutes. The most common statutory grounds for revocation are "unprofessional", "dishonorable", or "immoral" conduct. The courts are in substantial agreement that these
quoted words are construed to mean that which by common
understanding is considered grossly immoral, disreputable,
and dishonorable in connection with the practice of medicine,
Piton v. Medical Examiners, 13 Ariz. 354, 114 Pac. 962
(1911) ; State ex rel Larentine v. State Bd. of Health, 334
Mo. 220, 65 S. W. 2d 943 (1933), but are not construed to
warrant revocation for mere breach of generally accepted
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ethics of the profession. Chenoweth v. State Medical Examiners, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238 (1884). Particular matters held to be within such statutory grounds include drunkenness, Crabb v. Kan. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 118
Kan. 513, 235 Pac. 829 (1925) ; Senior v. State Bd. of Health,
32 R. I. 484, 96 A. 340 (1916), writing illegal liquor prescriptions, State v. Hiller, 260 Mo. 242, 180 S.W. 538 (1915), obtaining a license by fraud or misrepresentation, People v.
Reid, 151 App. Div. 324, 136 N. Y. S. 428 (1912) ; State Bd. of
Health v. Ray, 22 R. I. 538, 48 A. 802 (1901), inducing a
person to submit to treatment by a person who is not a physician by representing him to be such, Dillard v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 69 Colo. 575, 196 Pac. 866 (1921) ; Davis
v. Bd. of Registration, 251 Mass. 283, 146 N. E. 708 (1925),
prescribing drugs for addicts without any attempt or purpose
to cure them, Knoop v. State Bd. of Health, 41 R. I. 283, 103
A. 904 (1913) and paying commissions to a lay solicitor of
patients, Bell v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N. Y.,
295 N. Y. 101, 65 N. E. 2d 184, 163 A. L. R. 900 (1946).
Libelous matters published and printed by a chiropractor
attacking a hospital and the Veterans Bureau for purpose of
gain was held to be sufficient grounds for revocation of his
license. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Spears, 79 Colo.
588, 247 Pac. 563 (1926). However, the court in the principal
case distinguished this from the situation before it in which
slanderous remarks were made in private conversations with
persons who had a professional interest in the conditions described and with no purpose of personal gain.
The board in the principal case contended that the acts
done would cause the patients of the physicians criticized
to lose trust in them, and also that the acts demonstrate a
person of such character that the practice of medicine by
him would be detrimental to the public. Neither argument,
however, is sound, for in our society harsh criticism is a
frequent occurrence, and "a toughening of mental hide" is
the answer for it. As for the acts being a demonstration of
bad character, surely this stamp could not be put on people
prone to speak their mind, for, if so, many people in the
medical profession would be regarded as having bad character.
As the court said in the principal case, "the common sense and
sound judgment of the public in reaction to unwarranted
criticism affords better protection than that sought by the
board." The test is whether the effect of these acts upon
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public health, safety, and morals is of such a serious nature
as to warrant the ultimate penalty of revocation. There has
been very little litigation in South Carolina concerning the
revocation of a physician's license. The acts complained of
in the principal case are not specified as a ground in the
South Carolina statute. "Immoral conduct" is the general or
"catch-all" ground in the South Carolina statute, and the
courts would be stretching this to the utmost to include within
it harsh and critical language such as that complained of in
the principal case.
EDWARD W. MULLINS.

TORTS-HUSBAND AND WIFE-Wife's Right of Action for Loss of Consortium Due to Negligent Injury of
Husband.-Plaintiff brought an action for loss of the consortium of her husband, specifically companionship and sexual relations, occasioned by the defendant bus company's negligence resulting in the total permanent disability of the
plaintiff's husband. Defendant appealed from a judgment
of $25,000 in favor of the plaintiff, asserting that an action
of this kind was not authorized by statute or the common
law. HELD: Affirmed on the condition that $10,000 remittitur be entered. Any interference with the right of either
spouse to the enjoyment of the other is a violation of natural
right as well as a legal right arising out of the marriage relation. Even in the absence of a specific statute giving the
wife a cause of action for loss of consortium, reason and
justice dictated that recovery should be allowed. Missouri
Pacific TransportationCompany v. Miller, __ Ark. -, 299 S.
W. 2d 41 (1957).
The traditional rule is that the wife may not recover for
the loss of consortium resulting from the negligent injury
of her husband. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N. E.
631 (1912) ; Feneff v. N. Y. Central and H. R. Co., 203 Mass.
278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909). The only decisions attempting to
deviate from this weight of authority, Hipp v. E. I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921) ; Griffen
v. CincinnatiRealty Co., 27 Ohio Dec. 585 (Super. Ct. 1913),
were overruled at the earliest opportunity. Hinnant v. Tide
Water Power Co., 189 N. C. 120, 126 S. E. 307 (1925) ; Smith
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v. Nicholas Building Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N. E. 204
(1915). This traditional denial of recovery to the wife had
its foundation in the common law conception that the husband
and wife were one person; that person being the husband,
he alone could recover for the intentional or negligent invasions of his right to the consortium of his wife. See Feneff
v. N. Y. Central and H. R. Co., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436,
437 (1909). But with the passage of the several Married
Women's Acts, and the recognition of conjugal rights in the
wife, the majority of courts extended a right of recovery for
intentional interferences with her right of consortium. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, 85 Ohio St. 327, 98 N. E. 102 (1912)
(selling morphine to husband after wife forbade such sale);
Messervy v. Messervy, 82 S. C. 559, 64 S. E. 753 (1909)
(alienation of affections). But in the absence of a statute
conferring the right, see Ellis v. Fallert,-

Ore.

-,

307 Pac.

2d 283, 284 (1957), the courts have uniformly denied any
recovery to the wife for the loss of consortium resulting from
negligent injury, Feneff v. N. Y. Central and H. R. Co., supra,
creating new reasons for their holding since the old disability
of coverture no longer applied. One theory of denial is that
where a negligent injury is involved, the prayer of recovery
is predominantly for the loss of services, and since a wife is
due no services from her husband, she cannot recover, Boden
v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N. E. 860 (1933), but
where an intentional interference is shown, recovery is al-

lowed for injury to the sentimental element of consortium on
the theory that the wrongdoer should be punished. Flandermeyer v. Cooper, supra. A few states have resolved this inconsistency by denying recovery to either spouse in an action
based on negligent injury, on the theory that the husband is
no longer entitled to his wife's services due to the Married
Women's Acts. Bolger v. Boston Elevated R. Co., 205 Mass.
420, 91 N. E. 389 (1910). But cf. Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. et al., 196 S. C. 230, 13 S. E. 2d 1 (1941) (Husband's
right to wife's services remain despite the Married Women's
Acts). Other courts, recognizing injury to the sentimental
elements of consortium in a negligent invasion, nevertheless
deny the wife recovery, concluding: in negligence cases the
purpose of recovery is compensation for the direct consequences of the wrong, and the injury to the wife is too indirect and remote to be admeasurable, Maloy v. Foster, 169
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Misc. 964, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 608 (1938) ; fear of double recovery,
Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N. Y. S. 459 (1900);
Married Women's Acts created no new substantive right,
only removed procedural disability, Bernhardt v. Perry, 276
Mo. 612, 208 S. W. 462 (1918). However, in recent decisions,
a minority of the courts have considered the logic and reasoning of the majority as specious and fallacious, and in the
light of reason and justice, granted the wife recovery for
the loss of consortium due to negligent injury of the husband.
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D. C. Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U. S. 852 (1950), 23 A. L. R. 2d 1366, followed by Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb.
1953) (guessing at Neb. law); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee
Coaches, 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S. E. 2d 24 (1953) ; Acuff v.
Schmidt, 78 N. W. 2d 480 (Iowa, 1956) and the principal
case. See Gist v. French, 136 Cal. 2d 247, 288 Pac. 2d 1003
(1955) (dictum) ; Burk v. Anderson, et al., 109 N. E. 2d 407
(Ind., 1952) (dictum). In spite of the sound logic presented
in the cases allowing recovery, most courts have followed
the majority opinion, contending that any change in the wellestablished rule must come from the legislative body. Ripley,
et al. v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla., 1952) ; Nickel v. Hardware
Mutual Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N. W. 2d 205 (1955);
cf. Lurie, et al. v. Mammone, et al., 200 Misc. 320, 107 N. Y. S.
2d 182 (1951) (change must come from appellate court).
The situation at the present time is that the husband and
wife may recover for intentional interferences with their
marital rights, the husband may recover for negligent invasion of his marital rights, but the wife may not recover for
the same type injury to her husband. The courts have accomplished this obvious inconsistency by an effective, if illogical,
transition of the historical common law disability of coverture. But, there can be no doubt that today the husband and
wife are considered to have mutual rights and obligations
in the marriage relation. For example, where there is a negligent injury to the wife which extinguishes the sexual relations in the marriage, the husband can recover, but where
the situation is reversed, the wife is denied recovery. This
inconsistency would seem to have as its gravamen that any
children of a marriage are more important to the husband
than to the wife. Whereas in divorce proceedings, in the
normal situation, the wife is the favored party in granting
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custody of any children. Some courts have resolved the inconsistency by denying the right of recovery in a tort action
to both parties, but if consortium includes the comfort, companionship, and affection of one spouse to the other, as it is
generally recognized, then denying both parties recovery does
no more than to make the law symmetrical, rather than to
afford protection of a legal right. Without any legislative
action the courts seized the initiative in granting the wife
recovery for intentional interferences with her marital rights,
and there is no logic or reason why the courts, not the legislature, should not exercise their judicial function in remedying a situation in which the reason for the rule has ceased
to exist, but the rule dominates the exercise of reason and
justice.
CHARLES

M. GIBSON.

TRUSTS-Revocation-Effectiveness.- Settlor conveyed
property in trust to a bank under an inter vivos trust indenture which provided for revocation of trust by settlor
at any time during her life by written instrument executed
and probated as required by the laws of South Carolina
for recording deeds. It was also provided that "upon the
elapse (sic) of sixty days from delivery to the trustee by
the grantor of such deed or other instrument this trust
indenture shall be deemed to have been revoked." Settlor
delivered an instrument of revocation in proper form to
the trustee but died before the expiration of the sixty day
period. HELD: The trust was effectively revoked, since such
period was merely for the trustee's benefit, and especially in
the absence of a provision that the grantor must be alive at
the end of the sixty-day period after executing the revocation.
Peoples National Bank of Greenville v. Peden, 229 S. C. 167,
92 S. E. 2d 163 (1956).
It is a general rule that where a valid and effective voluntary trust has been created without reservation of power to
revoke, the trust is irrevocable. Alderman v. Alderman, 178
S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897 (1934) ; McElveen v. Adams, 108 S. C.
437, 94 S. E. 733 (1917). The settlor may, however, by express terms reserve in himself a power to revoke or cancel
the trust. Downs v. Security Trust Co., 175 Ky. 789, 194
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S. W. 1041 (1917); Alderman v. Alderman, supra. Such a
power of revocation is entirely consistent with the creation
of a valid trust. Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168
N. E. 349 (1929); Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass.
1858). If the settlor does not specify any mode of revocation, the power can be exercised in any manner which sufficiently manifests the intention of the settlor to revoke the
trust. Landbin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md. 240, 181 A. 353
(1935); Lipic v. Wheeler, 362 Mo. 499, 242 S. W. 2d 43
(1951). But it is well established as a general proposition,
that where the settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust
in a particular manner, it can be revoked only in that manner.
Downs v. Security Trust Co., supra; Brown v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 A. 523 (1915). It has also been held that a
"substantial compliance" with the terms of the trust instrument is insufficient. Richardson v. Stevenson, 193 Wis. 89,
213 N. W. 673 (1927). Thus, if a settlor reserves the power
to revoke by deed, there exists no power to revoke by will.
Carpenter v. Cook, 132 Cal. 621, 64 P. 997 (1901). If with
the requirement of such deed, he also requires notice to be
given to the trustee, there cannot be a revocation without such
notice. Brown v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra. But it has also
been held with some degree of consistency that such provisions for notice are for the sole benefit of the trustee, and if
waived by the trustee, the settlor may revoke without complying with such mode of revocation. Merchants National
Bank of Mobile v. Cowley, 89 So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1956); St.
Louis Union Trust Co. v. Dudley, 162 S. W. 2d 290 (Mo. App.
1942) ; Miller v. Exchange National Bank of Tulsa, 183 Okla.
114, 80 P. 2d 209 (1938). A liberal construction should be
given to the statements in the instrument as to the methods
of revocation, 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, Sec. 996
(1948). In Hackley UnionNational Bank v. Farmer,252 Mich.
674, 234 N.W. 135 (1935), a power to revoke by an instrument
delivered to the trustee was validly exercised even though
the settlor died before the instrument reached the trustee, and
he had mailed a certified copy of the instrument instead.
Here the court reasoned that the provision for delivery was
to avoid fraudulent claims after the settlor's death, and that
the purpose was fully achieved by the settlor's unequivocal
act in mailing a certified copy of the revocation during her
lifetime. Mere formal difficulties should not be allowed to
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invalidate the effect of substantial compliance. Vincent V.
Bishop of Sodor, 137 Eng. Rep. 764 (1849) ; Burdett v. Spillman, 8 Eng. Rep. 722 (1842).
The decision reached in this case is chiefly of interest in
that it is one of the few reported cases which sustains the
position that under certain circumstances courts will relax
the general rule of meticulous strictness where a particular
mode of revocation has been specified in the trust indenture.
The decision is both logical and correct in the light of existing
case law, although this case on close analysis would seem
to expand those prior decisions to their reasonable bounds.
It was contended by respondents, and on sound legal footing,
that a notice requirement in the trust indenture is for the
benefit of the trustee and may be waived by him. In the
instant case the provision for the sixty-day period was unquestionably for the benefit of the trustee, but there was no
waiver of the provision by the trustee. A waiver under the
circumstances of this case would have been, for example, a
return of the corpus of the trust to the settlor before the
expiration of the sixty-day period. No such action was taken.
A second basis of the court's decision is that the settlor had
done all that was required of her to revoke the trust. It must
be remembered, however, that the settlor may prescribe whatever conditions precedent to revocation he desires to set, and
these must be observed before the trust can be deemed to be
revoked. Thus, a settlor can unquestionably incorporate whatever fortuitous future events he specifies into the event of
revocation, and the fact that it is beyond his control or that
the settlor has complied with all other requirements for revocation would hardly seem to be a basis for allowing the courts
to disregard the provision. A third emphasis is placed on
the absence of any provision in the trust indenture that the
settlor had to be alive at the expiration of the sixty-day
period. This fact alone adds considerable weight to the holding of the case. The expression "during her life" as contained
in the trust indenture was given the logical explanation that
the settlor could not revoke by will, but, not to mean that the
settlor must be alive at the time the revocation of the trust
became effective and complete. Thus, problematically the
question arises as to when the trust was to be considered revoked-at the time of delivery to the trustee or at the lapse
of the sixty-day period. The court did not rule on this precise
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point. It could, perhaps, be implied that the trust was effectively revoked on delivery, and this is the interpretation that
Bogert in his work, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, has given to the
case. However, it would seem to be just as reasonable to hold
the trust revoked at the end of the sixty-day period in view
of the express language of the trust indenture declaring the
trust revoked on the termination of such period, and the
absence of any provision that the settlor should be alive. It
would appear that the trust would be revoked by its own
terms sixty days after delivery of the instrument of revocation to the trustee; and a consideration of such factors as
waiver by the trustee and the fact that the settlor had done all
that was required of her to revoke the trust would seem unimportant or secondary. On the whole, it would seem that
because of the factual dissimilarity, the court could not rest
its decision squarely on the holdings of prior cases dealing
with the same general problem of notice. Rather it employs
the over-all reasoning of these prior cases to justify the liberal consideration of the notice requirement.
MCCONNELL FAUCETTE.
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